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JUDICIAL CONTROL OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN
PRETRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION
A program of pretrial diversion removes certain eligible sus-
pects from the traditional criminal justice process and places them
in programs that are designed to accomplish a basic goal of the
criminal justice system, the "correctional reform and social restora-
tion of offenders."1 Diversion does not guarantee a noncriminal
disposition of a suspect's case, because the suspect is required to
meet specific conditions before the prosecutor foregoes the right to
bring the case to trial.2 To protect this right, the prosecutor usu-
ally insists on a waiver of the suspect's constitutional right to a
speedy trial and statutory right to invoke the statute of limita-
tions.3 Some prosecutors fully protect themselves by requiring a
guilty plea or an admission of guilt before diversion. In return for
the surrender of these rights and the consent to a restraint on lib-
erty,5 the suspect avoids the stigma of a criminal conviction6 and
1. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JusTrcE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS
77 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS]. The Commission includes a similar definition
of diversion. Id. at 73.
2. The imposition of conditions on the diverted suspect is a defining characteristic of
diversion. See R. NIMMER, DIvERsION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSECUTION
5 (1974). Prosecutors insist on the right to reinstitute proceedings at any time. See NAT'L
DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 11.6 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as PROSECUTION STANDARDS].
3. See Nat'l Pretrial Intervention Service Center of the A.B.A. Comm'n on Correctional
Facilities and Services, Legal Issues and Characteristics of Pretrial Intervention Programs,
4 CAP. U.L. Rav. 37, 43-44 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Pretrial Intervention]. The sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial attaches when a suspect becomes an "accused," which
happens at a formal indictment or charge, e.g. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 319
(1971), or at an arrest, e.g. Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975). The term
"accused" apparently has a different meaning when the sixth amendment right to the pres-
ence of counsel is involved. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
4. See Pretrial Intervention, supra note 3, at 68. The broad scope of the fifth amend-
ment privilege applies to the diversion situation: "[It] can be claimed in any proceeding, be
it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory." Murphy v. Wa-
terfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
5. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
6. The avoidance of the stigma of a criminal prosecution is an important goal of diver-
sion. See Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 848 (1974).'
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benefits from the programs offered by the prosecutor.' Thus, an
exchange is inherent in diversion, which illustrates the close kin-
ship between diversion and the more familiar bargained-for guilty
plea.8
No two diversion programs are alike, and they may operate at
opposite ends of the pretrial criminal justice process. The Court
Employment Project of New York City is a typical "late" diversion
program that operates only after criminal defendants are formally
charged." While their trials are adjourned for 90 or 180 days, the
defendants participate in group and individual counseling, and
they benefit from the Project's efforts at job and academic place-
ment. Habitual and violent offenders are excluded, and addicts
and alcoholics are covered by separate diversion programs.10 When
the defendants have successfully completed their programs, the
charges against them are dropped by the district attorney.
In contrast to late diversion programs, "early" diversion pro-
grams operate before any charges have been filed. The Citizen's
Probation Authority (CPA) of Genesee County, Michigan, offers
the same services and programs as the Court Employment Project
of New York City, but it does not divert charged defendants, and
it often diverts suspects before they have been arrested."' In the
pre-arrest situation, prosecutors and police confer on whether to
issue an arrest warrant or to refer the suspect immediately to the
diversion staffk.' If diversion is appropriate, contact with the sus-
pect is made by a "Police Liaison and Training Officer," who "in-
terviews the applicant to advise him of his Constitutional Rights,
explains the purpose and nature of the CPA program, secures the
7. The programs offered can be quite extensive. See R. NIMMER, supra note 2, at 53-91,
detailing programs offering employment, counseling, the resolution of family disputes, and
the treatment of drug addicts and alcoholics.
8. See Note, supra note 6, at 843.
9. See SUBCOMMIErrr ON ELIMINATION OF INAPPROPRIATE AND UNNECESSARY JURISDICTION
OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES FOR COURT ADMINISTRATION OF THE APPELLATE DIVISIONS,
FIRST AND SECOND DEPARTMENTS, DIVERSION FROM THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN ALTERNATIVE
TO TRIAL AND INCARCERATION 163 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DIVERSION FROM THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS].
10. Id. at 168, 170.
11. See Non-Trial Disposition of Criminal Offenders: A Case Study, 5 U. MIcH. J.L.
REP. 453, 453-54, 462 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Non-Trial Disposition]; and DIVERSION
FROM TiE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 9, at 154.
12. See NAT'L DIST. ArORNEY'S Ass'N, A PROSECUTOR'S MANUAL ON SCREENING AND
DIVERSIONARY PROGRAMS 36 (1974).
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cooperation of the client and refers him to a staff counselor."'13 If
the "client" refuses to cooperate, the officer refers the case back to
the prosecutor for further disposition.14
Diversion emerged as a formal institution within the criminal
justice system in 1967, when the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice recom-
mended the "[elarly identification and diversion to other commu-
nity resources of those offenders in need of treatment, for whom
full criminal disposition does not appear required."1 5 Since that
time, pretrial diversion programs have rapidly multiplied,18
spurred by the recommendations of the National Advisory Com-
mission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals and the Na-
tional District Attorney's Association. 8 Despite the proliferation of
pretrial diversion programs, the unusual legal problems these pro-
grams generate have received less attention than is warranted.19
This neglect may be partly due to the unquestioning acceptance of
the claim made by prosecutors that pretrial diversion is simply an
instance of their broad discretion not to charge or to drop charges
against a convictable suspect.
20
This Comment argues the contrary position: that the discre-
tion to divert suspects from the criminal justice process is a signifi-
cant extension of the prosecutor's discretion to bargain with sus-
pects and therefore requires close judicial supervision. Section I of
the Comment analyzes the conflict between prosecutorial and judi-
cial roles and concludes that diversion at any stage requires both
prosecutorial discretion and judicial supervision. Section H ex-
plores the dimensions of this expanded discretion and the kind of
13. Id. at 77-78.
14. Id. at 78.
15. PRESMENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, THE CHAUENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 134 (1967) (emphasis in original).
16. See Pretrial Intervention, supra note 3, at 38. Unfortunately, the most recent data
on the growth of diversion programs is a decade old.
17. See CORRECTIONS, supra note 1, Standard 3.1.
18. See PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 150.
19. The best recent analyses of the legal problems involved in diversion are quite dated.
See Pretrial Intervention, supra note 3; Non-Trial Disposition, supra note 11; Note, supra
note 6.
20. See Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 174,
187-89 (1965). Kaplan provides a concrete example of a situation where a prosecutor exer-
cised his discretion not to prosecute a convictable suspect. See Annot., 69 A.L.R. 240 (1930)
for a general discussion of the prosecutor's power not to prosecute.
1982]
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judicial scrutiny it makes necessary. Section III analyzes discretion
and its control when the denial or termination of discretion is in-
volved. Finally, Section IV reviews and summarizes the proper ad-
justment of prosecutorial and judicial roles in pretrial diversion.
I. THE CONFLICT OF PROSECUTORIAL AND JUDICIAL ROLES IN
DIVERSION
A. The Judicial Role in Early Diversion
When the government initiates contact with a suspect through
an arrest, prosecutorial discretion and judicial supervision share a
common starting point. Whether an arrest is followed by a prompt
hearing or a warrant is issued prior to an arrest, the prosecutor's
authority to restrain a suspect's liberty depends upon a demonstra-
tion of probable cause to a judicial officer.21 Since pretrial diver-
sion also involves a restraint on liberty, 2 one would expect that
probable cause would continue as the threshold for the
prosecutorial discretion to divert. However, a few prosecutors have
established programs that divert suspects before an arrest has oc-
curred or a warrant has issued,23 thus avoiding the requirement
that they demonstrate probable cause. The United States Supreme
Court indicated that such a procedure is constitutionally invalid in
Gerstein v. Pugh,24 where Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
noted:
Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite
to the charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer re-
straints on liberty other than the condition that they appear for trial. There
are many kinds of pretrial release and many degrees of conditional liberty.
. . . We cannot define specifically those that would require a prior probable
cause determination, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty20
21. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). The suspect has the right to be free
from arrest until the police have probable cause to believe he has committed a crime. He
also has the right to have a neutral magistrate make this determination. The standard, of
course, is the same. Id. at 120.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 26-28.
23. See DIVERSION PROM THE JUmDCML PROCESS, supra note 9, at 266, and Non-Trial
Disposition, supra note 11, at 462.
24. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
25. Id. at 125 n.26. Since the fifth amendment does not require a showing of probable
cause before charging, it appears that the only constitutional limit on the discretion to initi-
ate prosecution would stem from the substantive limitations of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Prosecuting, and especially bargaining for guilty pleas or diversion,
[Vol. 31
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In fact, most diversion programs do involve substantial and
prolonged restraints on liberty. For instance, the Citizen's Proba-
tion Authority of Genesee County, Michigan, typically requires
that the diverted suspect remain within the state, report regularly
to a counselor, and avoid other known law violators.2 6 Participants
may also be required to keep a job, stay in school, or make restitu-
tion to the victims of the crime.2 7 Since participation in this pro-
gram can last up to one year,28 there is little doubt that diversion
programs of this sort cannot constitutionally operate without a
showing of probable cause.2 9
B. The Prosecutorial Role in Late Diversion
The previous discussion demonstrates that the discretion to
divert must be accompanied by judicial control, no matter how
early in the criminal justice process diversion occurs. At the later
stages of the criminal justice process, there are cases which hold
that diversion becomes solely a judicial responsibility.30 In the case
of People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County,31 the California
Supreme Court invalidated a statutory diversion scheme that as-
signed to the district attorney the responsiblity of determining
whether defendants charged with possession of drugs met the stat-
utory criteria for diversion.2 Once possession was established, the
probation department conducted a background check to determine'
the defendant's suitability for diversion. A judicial hearing fol-
lowed in which the court could order the diversion of the defen-
dant with the concurrence of the district attorney. It was that
"veto power" in the district attorney which the court found repug-
when no charge could be maintained against the suspects, would constitute a major invasion
of privacy rights.
26. See Non-Trial Disposition, supra note 11, at 458 n.27.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 454.
29. This was also the conclusion of the author of Non-Trial Disposition, id. at 461-62.
30. See, e.g., State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 376, 375 A.2d 607, 615 (1977) (diversion
programs established according to the rules of the Supreme Court of New Jersey were sub-
ject to judicial review which, although limited, included the power to overrule a prosecutor's
decision not to divert). See also Pace v. State, 566 S.W.2d 861, 870 (Tenn. 1978) (Henry,
C.J., concurring), which described diversion as "essentially judicial in character." Id. at 870.
31. People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County (On Tai Ho), 11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d
405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974).
32. This is a general summary of sections 1000-1000.2 of the CAL. PENAL CODE (West
Supp. 1981).
1982]
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nant to the provisions of the California Constitution dealing with
the separation of powers:33
[W]hen the jurisdiction of a court has been properly invoked by the filing of a
criminal charge, the disposition of that charge becomes a judicial responsibil-
ity. It is true that acquittal or sentencing is the typical choice open to the
court, but in appropriate cases it is not the only termination. With the devel-
opment of more sophisticated responses to the wide range of antisocial be-
havior traditionally subsumed under the heading of "crime," alternative
means of disposition have been confided to the judiciary... . [C]ivil commit-
ment to the narcotics addict rehabilitation program is a disposition which
may be viewed as a specialized form of probation.. .. it too is an exercise of
the judicial power."
Thus, the California Supreme Court held that once charges are
filed, the doctrine of separation of powers binds the prosecutor to
divert those who are recommended by the probation department
and approved by the court.35 It is important to realize that this
holding mandates judicial control whether the prosecutor decides
to grant or refuse diversion. In the latter case, the prosecutor can
only resort to his traditional powers to screen a suspect out of the
criminal justice process, plea bargain with him, or bring him to
trial.$' The holding of the California Supreme Court takes these
choices away from the prosecutor whenever an arraigned suspect is
deemed to be eligible for diversion under the statutory criteria.
This wholesale abolition of traditional prosecutorial options is
an unnecessarily harsh response to the legal problems associated
with diversion. Unless the prosecutor decides to grant diversion,
there is no threat to the judicial sentencing function3 7 or the legiti-
33. See CAL. CONST., art. H, §3.
34. People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal. 3d at 66, 520 P.2d at 410,
113 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
35. The court reasoned that the statute creating diversion for charged defendants es-
sentially provided for a judicial disposition for those who are or might be diverted under its
provisions. Despite the broad sweep of some of the court's language, it is clear that it is
diversion, and not accusation, which makes the disposition inherently judicial. Id. at 66-67,
520 P.2d at 410, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 26. If it were the accusation, the holding of the court
would require the prosecutor to try every charged defendant.
36. The decision to plea bargain is a subcategory of the decision to prosecute, involving
the prosecutor's discretion to select the charge. See F. MILLER, PROsECuiroN: THE DECisION
TO CHARGE A SusPEcT wrrH A CRTM 169 (1970). The classic statement of the prosecutor's
basic choice between prosecuting and screening out is made in Baker, The Prosecutor-
Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. OF CaM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Scl. 770 (1933).
37. Courts are always free to place the prosecuted and convicted defendants on proba-
tion, which is the post-conviction equivalent of diversion. See Commonwealth v. Kindness,
[Vol. 31914
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mate interests of suspects.38 By refusing to divert, the prosecutor
confines himself to his traditional options, and the liberty of the
suspect is secure until a judge passes sentence.39 Thus, the discre-
tion to grant diversion and the discretion to refuse diversion need
not stand or fall together. Nevertheless, the rationale adopted by
the California Supreme Court in People v. Superior Court of San
Mateo County made the all-or-nothing approach inevitable. In
searching for a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers,
the court had to interpret the California Constitution to mean that
only a judge could grant or refuse diversion to eligible suspects.4 °
Therefore, any rival discretion in the prosecutor had to be uncon-
stitutional, even though the prosecutor might exercise that discre-
tion in the suspect's favor by screening him out of the criminal
justice process.
This interpretation of the judicial power proved to be as un-
workable as it was unusual. Prosecutors in California have appar-
ently avoided the holding of the case simply by conducting their
diversion program prior to any charging.4 In addition, it is not
necessary to deny the prosecutor's role in order for the court to
maintain ultimate responsibility for the disposition of the charge.
The charges will only be disposed of when the arraigned suspect
247 Pa. Super. 99, 104, 371 A.2d 1346, 1348 (1977).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 43-76.
39. Of course, a suspect may suffer a deprivation of liberty if he is arrested and held for
trial, but this requires that the judge make a finding of probable cause. See supra note 21
and accompanying text.
40. One court has argued that the California Supreme Court did not rely on the inher-
ently judicial nature of diversion, but on the narrower legislative grant of power to the
courts to discuss a case in the interests of justice. See Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa.
Super. 99, 105, 371 A.2d 1346, 1348 (1977). However, if the judicial power over diversion is a
matter of legislative grace, it is hard to see how a later legislative reduction of that power
could violate the doctrine of separation of powers. In fact, this interpretation is inconsistent
with the languag- of the opinion and its consideration of the issue of severability, both of
which indicate that once diversion is provided for, it is an inherently judicial function that
is constitutionally immune from a prosecutor's veto. Finally, the power to dismiss a prosecu-
tion in the interests of justice would not explain the court's holding that the court has power
to divert even those suspects that the prosecutor wants to screen out of the criminal justice
process.
41. See DVRsasIoN FROM THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 9, at 133-36, where four Cal-
ifornia diversion programs are listed that operate before arrest. See also State v. Greenlee,
228 Kan. 712, 620 P.2d 1132 (1980), where a Kansas prosecutor declined to follow the statu-
tory diversion scheme and implemented one of his own. In this case, the prosecutor's con-
tention that the statutory diversion scheme was unconstitutional was rejected, and the court
directed the prosecutor to comply with the statute. Id. at 717, 620 P.2d at 1138.
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has successfully completed the program of diversion or has merited
termination from the program and resumption of prosecution. If
the court maintains control over these events, it has not aban-
doned any of its responsibilities concerning disposition of the
charge.42 The prosecutor's proper role in the diversion decision
need not be denied, therefore, even when that decision is made af-
ter an arraignment or formal charge. The prosecutorial discretion
to divert and the judicial control of that discretion should operate
together whenever diversion occurs. However, diversion alters the
bargaining power of the prosecutor and the responsibilities of the
court, and these changes must be carefully examined in order to
understand the prosecutorial and judicial roles in diversion.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROSECUTORIAL AND JUDICIAL ROLES IN
DIVERSION
A. The Prosecutor's New Power
While diversion presents a new option to prosecutors, its form
is somewhat similar to that of the familiar plea bargain. However,
there are substantial differences between the old plea bargain and
the new diversion bargain. Constitutional rights are still exchanged
for prosecutorial concessions,43 but the bargain has been removed
from the context of a criminal prosecution, and the stakes involved
have been radically altered. A prosecutor's offer of diversion is
much harder to resist than an offer of leniency in return for a
guilty plea," which insures that the diversion bargain will have a
broader impact on suspects than the plea bargain. At the same
time, diversion bypasses the traditional criminal justice process 45
and, with it, the traditional judicial controls on prosecutorial
bargaining.
Diversion is the irresistible bargain because it gives the prose-
cutor a bigger carrot and stick than he has in plea bargaining. In
diversion, the prosecutor can offer a complete escape from the
42. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text for an example of a statutory diver-
sion scheme that implements this reasoning.
43. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
44. See NAT'L ADvisoRy COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, TASK
FORCE REPORT. THE COURTS 9 (1967).
45. Diversion always involves an escape from the criminal justice process' adjudicatory
stage. See CORRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 73. Early diversion may mean a complete bypass of
the criminal justice process. See supra note 11.
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criminal justice process, not just a lesser charge or a lighter sen-
tence.46 At the same time, the prosecutor will-protect the diversion
program by prosecuting those suspects who refuse to divert, even if
they would have been screened out before the diversion option be-
came available.47 With incentives like these, an offer of diversion
will rarely, if ever, be refused. Thus, the prosecutor will now be
able to divert, and not screen out, those for whom he feels any
criminal disposition is inappropriate. By the same token, he will be
able to divert, and not try, those who would have refused an of-
fered plea bargain.48
Diversion not only promises to expand the scope of
prosecutorial bargaining, it also removes the bargain from the judi-
cial scrutiny that accompanies traditional plea bargaining. A bar-
gained for guilty plea is an integral part of the criminal justice sys-
tem, and is allowed only after a judge has determined that the
suspect's waiver of fifth and sixth amendment rights is voluntary.49
A diversion bargain, on the other hand, aims at a complete avoid-
ance of the criminal justice system. In fact, some forms of diver-
sion may involve none of the constitutional rights associated with a
guilty plea. A suspect diverted before arrest has no sixth amend-
ment right to a speedy trial,50 and may accept and complete the
diversion program without making any incriminating statements.5 1
46. The prosecutor's usual weapons in traditional plea bargaining are sentence conces-
sions, reduced charges to crimes "reasonably related to the accused's conduct," and the dis-
missal of multiple charges. See PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 2, Standard 16.1 B.
47. See Note, supra note 6, at 842 n.81, which indicates that prosecutors sometimes
adopt this strategy.
48. Suspects who refuse to plead guilty as part of a plea bargain do so because they are
innocent or are willing to take their chances of acquittal at trial. See Note, supra note 6, at
835, which points out that diversion only saves court resources if it can dissuade suspects
like these from going to trial.
49. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). A guilty plea always involves
a waiver of fifth and sixth amendment rights. Id.
50. See supra note 3 and cases cited therein. This assumes that diversion itself would
not be held to be a substitute for a civil arrest, thus giving rise to the sixth amendment
right. In United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196, 203 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 435 U.S. 850 (1978) (interlocutory appeal), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that a "military arrest," although substantially less burdensome
than a usual police arrest, could trigger the right to a speedy trial. This holding was not
argued or considered when the Supreme Court eventually reversed on the merits. 456 U.S. 1,
9-10 n.10, (1982).
51. Most diversion programs emphasize candor in the initial interview, so incriminating
statements are likely at this stage. See DnrRsION FROM THE JUDrnci PROCESS, supra note 9,
at 77. This raises the interesting question of the applicability of Miranda prophylactic
19821
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Thus, from a prosecutor's perspective, diversion is the perfect bar-
gain. It is almost certain to be accepted, and it need not involve
the waiver of those constitutional rights that provoke the intense
judicial scrutiny which accompanies a plea bargain.
B. The Judge's New Responsibilities
While diversion may be the perfect bargain for prosecutors, it
poses grave risks to the constitutional rights of suspects. Although
diversion does not always involve the waiver of fifth and sixth
amendment rights which accompanies a guilty plea, it always in-
volves a restraint on liberty,52 and the greater attractiveness of the
diversion bargain makes coercion a greater threat than it is in a
plea bargain.5 3 Yet, while the risks are greater, there are no effec-
tive safeguards within the criminal justice system. A coerced con-
fession can be excluded," and a delayed prosecution dismissed,5
but the restoration of a coerced suspect's liberty is more problem-
atic. Even if an appropriate remedy could be fashioned, 5 it is very
unlikely that it would be pursued. A suspect who has been coerced
into diversion by the threat of prosecution will not withdraw from
the program and seek redress when he knows that such an action
will probably produce the very prosecution he fears. In addition,
rights to the diversion intake interview. Under the doctrine announced in Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the official questioner need only engage in words or actions that
he "should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 301. With
its emphasis on candor from a suspect who may eventually be prosecuted, the initial inter-
view with the diversion staff meets this definition of "interrogation." Therefore, if the sus-
pect is also in custody, any statements made cannot be used by the prosecutor as part of his
case-in-chief on a resumed prosecution unless he can show that the suspect's Miranda rights
were "scrupulously honored." See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
52. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
53. This is especially true when diversion is offered to someone in custody. See DivER-
SION FROM THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 9, at 72.
54. A coerced confession is excluded for all purposes at trial. See Harrold v. Oklahoma,
169 F. 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1909) (defendant who testified on his own behalf could not be cross-
examined on involuntary confession not mentioned in direct testimony). The same is not
true for violations of the Miranda prophylactic rules. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
226 (1971) (statements which are inadmissible by prosecutor's case-in-chief may be used to
impeach defendant's trial testimony).
55. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973) (dismissal of case is the ap-
propriate remedy where unnecessary delay has occurred in criminal prosecution).
56. If a diverted suspect is later convicted, his lost liberty could be restored by a reduc-
tion in his sentence. For those who are not convicted, their loss of liberty apparently cannot
be remedied.
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legal aid societies lack standing to assert the rights of suspects co-
erced into diversion. Thus, the loss of liberty will probably be
permanent, for the same coercion that creates the loss makes it
unlikely that those aggrieved will choose to seek redress.
Goldberg v. Kelly5 involved a similarly self-insulating govern-
ment deprivation. In that case, the suspension of welfare benefits
without a hearing created a constitutionally unacceptable risk that
eligible recipients would be deprived of their means of existence
while waiting for redress, thus rendering the temporary loss per-
manent50 In diversion, the conferral of an apparent government
benefit without a hearing poses a similar risk that diversion par-
ticipants will suffer a permanent loss of liberty. The distinction be-
tween conferral and suspension of government benefits has appar-
ently no significance in the procedural due process area, for in
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,0 the Supreme Court
concluded that the liberty interest asserted by foster families in
their privacy and autonomy could be threatened by the conferral
of an apparent government benefit-the reuniting of foster chil-
dren with their natural parents.6 " The liberty of the diverted sus-
pect is threatened by a government benefit in just the same way
that the liberty interest that foster children share with their new
families is threatened by a return to their natural parents. In
Smith, the Supreme Court held that the procedures providing for
pre-removal conferences and post-removal hearings adequately
protected the asserted liberty interest.6 2 In the diversion situation,
only similar provisions for independent review can adequately pro-
tect the liberty interest of suspects from being coerced by
prosecutorial bargaining.
Since judges already supply this independent review when
prosecutorial bargaining takes the form of a plea bargain, they
should perform the same function in the case of a diversion bar-
57. For a case denying standing to a legal aid society that sought to assert the rights of
a suspect coerced into diversion, see Hiscock Legal Aid Soc'y v. Hennessy, 101 Misc. 2d
1046, 1048, 422 N.Y.S.2d 616, 618 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga County 1974), aff'd 78 A.D.2d 775,
435 N.Y.S.2d 549 (4th Dep't 1980).
58. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
59. Id. at 264.
60. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
61. Id. at 842 n.45, where Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, allowed for an
identity of interest between the foster parents and children.
62. Id. at 856.
1982] 919
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gain, focusing their inquiry on the voluntariness of the suspect's
action.6 3 In the plea bargaining area, the Supreme Court has held
that the coercion inherent in prosecutorial bargaining is dissipated
when a suspect is fully informed of the consequences of his deci-
sion and is aided by counsel." Recognizing the need for a fully
informed consent, a report prepared for the Committee for Court
Administration of the Appellate Divisions of the First and Second
Judicial Departments of New York concluded that the diversion
participant
must be made to understand that there is no guarantee that his charges will
be dismissed, and that if prosecution is resumed his defenses may be im-
paired by unavailability of witnesses or lapses in witnesses' memories. If he is
ultimately convicted or pleads guilty after having been terminated from the
program, the fact of his failure to make a satisfactory effort toward rehabili-
tation will appear on his pre-sentencing report. Equally important, the defen-
dant must fully understand the nature of the rehabilitative efforts which will
be required of him. He should also be made to understand the consequences
of waiving the statute of limitations and the right to a speedy trial.05
Where diversion is conducted prior to a formal charge, the suspect
must be made aware of the charge contemplated by the prosecutor
before he can realize the consequences of delaying the preparation
of his defense. Finally, the suspect should be warned that partici-
pation in diversion might be used against him in a resumed prose-
cution as evidence of consciousness of guilt.6"
The judge should also conduct an inquiry into whether the
suspect has incriminated himself in any way before being offered
diversion.e If the suspect has already confessed or entered a guilty
63. The standard for determining the voluntariness of the surrender of fourteenth
amendment rights is different from that involved in the consideration of the voluntariness
of a guilty plea. The presence of the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial in the latter
case leads to a higher standard. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238 n.25
(1973). Since diversion usually involves waiver of the sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial, the higher standard would be appropriate. In pre-arrest diversion, however, there is no
sixth amendment right, and so a lower standard would be appropriate. See supra note 3.
64. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 754-55 (1970).
65. DiVERsION FROM THE JuiciAL PRocEss, supra note 9, at 71.
66. If diversion is voluntary, evidence of the participation could be admitted even if the
fifth amendment privilege applies to acts that imply a consciousness of guilt. For the fifth
amendment privilege to apply, however, participation in diversion would have to be "of a
testimonial or communicative nature." See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761
(1966).
67. A prior sixth amendment waiver of the right to a speedy trial should not have the
same coercive effect as a prior waiver of the fifth amendment privilege would have. All the
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plea, voluntary consent to diversion becomes virtually impossible.
A suspect who has not incriminated himself knows that if he re-
fuses to bargain he only risks a possible renewed prosecution. A
suspect who has incriminated himself, on the other hand, knows,
or thinks he knows, that a refusal to bargain will result in a sum-
mary conviction and sentence. Under these circumstances, the
prosecutor's offer of diversion can only be inherently coercive, and
this should be the end of the court's inquiry. The court need not
and should not reach the issue of whether the guilty plea could still
be dismissed or the confession excluded, for the inquiry into volun-
tariness looks only to the suspect's mind, and not to the ultimate
legal consequences of his actions. Once the suspect believes he has
lost the ability to contest the charges against him, he cannot refuse
the prosecutor's offer to drop the charges in return for a consent to
diversion. 8
Undoubtedly, the most important factor in dissipating
prosecutorial coercion is the presence of counsel at the point of
diversion. Since diversion involves the waiver of important rights
and has an enormous bearing on the eventual outcome of the case,
it is a "critical stage" that requires the appointment of counsel."'
Diversion can lead to a complete escape from the criminal justice
system and it can also mean a more vigorous prosecution and a
harsher sentence.7 0 The presence of counsel is essential to protect
the rights of a suspect considering diversion, and the whole process
will benefit from his involvement.7 ' He can advise his client about
the quality and quantity of the evidence, the seriousness of the
charge, and the chances for dismissal. He will also be able to assess
the risks involved in diversion, including the chances of an unfa-
suspect has lost in that case is a constitutional defense to a delayed prosecution. He retains
the right to contest the charges against him.
68. The reverse of this situation also poses interesting problems. If a person has been
diverted, should a later guilty plea or confession be accepted as voluntary? If no further
diversion is contemplated, they should be as voluntary as any other confession or guilty
plea, because the prosecutor's threat is unchanged-incriminate yourself or take your
chances with prosecution. If more diversion is contemplated, a guilty plea or confession is
more likely to be coerced, for now the threat is greater-incriminate yourself or lose the
benefits of the diversion program.
69. A critical stage is defined as any point where "substantial rights of a criminal ac-
cused may be affected." Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
70. A harsher sentence can result from an unfavorable pre-sentencing report. See supra
note 65 and accompanying text.
71. What follows in the text is summarized from Note, supra note 6, at 840-43.
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vorable termination and a diversion program that would be more
burdensome than the eventual sentence. As in all plea bargaining,
counsel should be primarily concerned with the legal, rather than
the moral, guilt of his client. 2 If the suspect would probably be
convicted, diversion should be urged by counsel. However, if ac-
quittal seems likely, diversion should be resisted, unless the sus-
pect has a particular need for rehabilitation or a desire to make
amends for his crime.
Once a judge is involved in the diversion decision, the prosecu-
tor may take the opportunity to fully protect his ability to try the
defendant at a later date.7s He may ask that the judge approve a
voluntary waiver of the statute of limitations, a waiver of the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial, or a waiver of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. If the suspect has been
charged, the prosecutor may ask for approval of a guilty plea. By
making any self-incrimination simultaneous with the consent to di-
version, the prosecutor avoids the coercion inherent when incrimi-
nation precedes diversion, but such a procedure may involve the
delegation of the judge's sentencing function.7' Although the sus-
pect in this case would enter diversion voluntarily, his simultane-
ous self-incrimination would make his continuation in the program
involuntary.75 The diverted suspect is not really free to withdraw if
he believes that such an action will result in a conviction and
sentence.7 6
72. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTIcE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 227 (1970).
73. Prosecutors claim that the guilty plea is essential because the delay involved in
diversion can make a later prosecution more difficult. However, the suspect suffers precisely
the same detriment to his defense. See DIVERSION FROM THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 9,
at 73-74.
74. See Note, supra note 6, at 843-44, which argues that all diversion is an encroach-
ment on the sentencing function.
75. Indeed, DIVERSION FROM THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 9, at 75, concludes that
any plea of guilty renders diversion inherently coercive.
76. If the prosecutor bargains for simultaneous diversion and a guilty plea, he must rely
on the one-time consent to the restraint on liberty, for continuing participation is coerced
by the existence of the plea. This may raise problems of involuntary servitude under the
thirteenth amendment. In Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), the threat of a prosecu-
tion for fraud based simply on a failure to pay one's debts was held to create involuntary
servitude. If a diverted suspect has pleaded guilty, he faces a certain conviction if he fails to
pay his "debt" to the prosecutor, and not merely the threat of a resumed prosecution.
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HI. DISCRETION AND CONTROL WHEN DIVERSION IS TERMINATED
OR DENIED
In contrast to the judicial supervision that must accompany
the discretion to divert, the prosecutor's discretion to deny diver-
sion should be complete and unreviewable. If this supervision were
extended to the prosecutor's choice to prosecute (including plea
bargaining) or screen out rather than divert, the prosecutor's func-
tion would no longer be independent of that of the court. The mere
presence of the diversion option should not drain the prosecutor of
his authority to make the two choices traditionally committed to
his discretion." In addition, due process does not compel the pros-
ecutor to grant a hearing when he denies diversion to a suspect. In
Menechino v. Oswald, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a prisoner under consideration for parole
release could not assert any procedural due process right to a hear-
ing.718 The court held that an anticipated but unattained freedom
of movement simply was not one of the interests protected by the
fourteenth amendment, which is concerned with "presently en-
joyed" rights. 9 In the same way, potential diversion participants
do not enjoy a freedom from prosecution until they are diverted.
Before that point, they are involved in the process of prosecution.80
Therefore, the prosecutor's prior decision not to divert does not
affect an interest that triggers the procedural due process right to a
hearing.8 1
When a prosecutor seeks to terminate diversion and resume
prosecution however, he must afford the participant a hearing to
protect the "presently enjoyed" freedom from prosecution. Like
the liberty of the parolee or probationer, this freedom is indetermi-
nate, but sufficient to invoke the protections of procedural due
process. 82 The Supreme Court held in Morrissey v. Brewer that
77. See supra note 36.
78. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1970).
79. 430 F.2d at 408.
80. For instance, they are involved in the process of bargaining with the prosecutor,
which is a crucial stage of the prosecution.
81. Procedural due process requires that a balancing test be applied when such an in-
terest is affected, such as the presently enjoyed right to the conditional liberty of parole. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-88 (1972).
82. It is no longer crucial under procedural due process to determine whether an indi-
vidual's interest is a "right" or a "privilege." Indeterminate interests are also protected. See
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
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due process required both a preliminary hearing and a hearing pro-
viding most of the traditional due process components before pa-
role could be finally revoked.83 The next term saw the holding ex-
tended to probation revocation in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.4 Since
diversion is usually understood as pretrial probation,85 and resem-
bles parole in its emphasis on rehabilitation, these cases indicate
that diversion cannot be terminated without a hearing. Whether
due process also requires the presence of counsel is not material,88
for the termination is as much, if not more, a "critical stage" of the
prosecution as the initiation of diversion. 7 Therefore, the sixth
amendment requires that counsel be present at the termination
hearing."
CONCLUSION
There are strict limits on prosecutorial discretion to divert at
both the intake and the termination stages. Due process requires
that a hearing be held at the intake stage because prosecutorial
bargaining without immediate judicial review poses a great risk of
an unremediable deprivation of liberty. To ensure that the consent
to diversion is voluntary, a judge should advise the suspect of the
consequences of his action, and refuse diversion if any self-incrimi-
nation has taken place. If diversion takes place prior to an arrest
or the issuing of an arrest warrant, a judge should also make a
determination of probable cause. If the prosecutor seeks to termi-
nate diversion and resume prosecution, due process again compels
him to conduct a hearing to protect the presently enjoyed freedom
from prosecution. At this point, a judge should determine whether
the suspect has lived up to his bargain. If he has, the prosecutor
should be held to his promise and the prosecution dismissed.89
83. 408 U.s. at 486-88.
84. 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
85. See Note, supra note 6, at 843.
86. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the proceeding was found to be of a
sufficiently non-adversarial character so that due process did not require the presence of
counsel. Id. at 789.
87. See supra text accompanying note 70.
88. This is also the conclusion of DIVERSION FROM THE JUDICL PROCESS, supra note 9,
at 37.
89. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971), where the Supreme Court
held that one of the safeguards of plea bargaining must be the fulfillment of prosecutorial
promises of leniency.
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New York's Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal pro-
cedure closely follows these guidelines.90 The statute requires hear-
ings and judicial approval at both the intake and termination
stages of diversion, but it does not give the court the power to
overrule a prosecutor's decision not to divert. The court imposes
any conditions connected with diversion, and the consent of the
defendant to these conditions must be specifically obtained. Once
adjourned, the dismissal of the charges after six months is pre-
sumed to be in the interest of justice, and the prosecutor may re-
but this presumption by pointing to specific instances of the defen-
dant's failure to live up to the agreed upon conditions.91 Thus,
New York's statutory diversion procedure harmonizes the rights of
the accused and the legitimate interests of prosecutors while pro-
viding for a new response to the complex social phenomenon of
crime."2
WILLIAM HELMER
90. See NEw YORK CraM. PRoc. LAw § 170.55 (McKinney 1982).
91. Id. (Practice Commentary).
92. The presence of other reforms of the criminal justice area, such as sentencing to
community service, should not deter the development of diversion programs. Although both
reforms propose to reduce the personal and societal costs of incarceration, they serve dis-
tinct purposes. A prosecutor's decision not to divert does not necessarily mean that incarcer-
ation is appropriate. For an interesting discussion of some of the legal issues involved in
community-service sentencing, see Comment, Liability for Injuries to Offenders Sentenced
to Community Service, 30 BuFFAIo L. Rav. 387 (1981) (particularly at 393 n.27).
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